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Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine:
Allowing State Regulation of Boat Engine
Manufacturers Through Products Liability
Lawsuits
Richard Cutshall*
I. Introduction
In 2000, nearly 13 million boats and watercraft were owned
and operated within the United States.1 In the same year, there were
nearly 8000 accidents, injuring more than 4300 people-701 fatally. 2
Of those fatal incidents, 25 involved contact with the boat's propeller
at some point in the chain of events. 3 In 2000, a total of 88 incidents
involved propeller strikes.4 That is, 28% of the propeller strikes
reported in 2000 were fatal. Only two other types of boating
accidents-capsizing and falls overboard-killed people more
consistently.5 Despite these numbers, the United States Coast Guard,
which regulates boat safety under the Federal Boat Safety Act
("FBSA"), has decided not to require propeller 6guards or other
technology that could help prevent propeller strikes.
Many products liability lawsuits have been filed against boat
*

Richard Cutshall, J.D. candidate, May 2004, Loyola University Chicago

School of Law; B.A., Political Science, 2001, University of Minnesota. The author
would like to thank his family and friends for all their help and support.
I U. S. COAST GUARD, BOATING STATIsTIcs 2000, 6 (Oct. 1, 2000),
http://www. uscgboating.org/statistics/Boating-Statistics_2000.pdf.
2 Id. at 9.
' Id. at 21.
4 Id. at
27.
5 Capsizing was fatal in 205 of 502 accidents, a rate of 40.8%, and falls
overboard were fatal in 213 of 610 accidents, a rate of 35%. Id. at 27.
6 See Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 123 S. Ct. 518, 525 (2002) [hereinafter
Sprietsma III].
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engine manufacturers for failure to install propeller guards. Some of
these cases were successful, but most were dismissed on the ground
that they were preempted by the FBSA and the Coast Guard's
decision not to require propeller guards.7 Because of the
disagreement among the lower courts, the United States Supreme
Court decided to hear the issue in Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine.' In
reversing the Illinois Supreme Court's dismissal of the case on
preemption grounds, the Court held that the FBSA neither expressly
nor impliedly preempts state tort claims for failure to install propeller9
guards, regardless of the Coast Guard's decision not to require them.
This note will review the key doctrines and decisions
involved in Sprietsma. Part II will discuss the doctrine of federal
preemption, the FBSA, the Coast Guard's decision not to require
propeller guards, and the cases leading up to the Court's hearing of
Sprietsma. Part III will discuss the decisions of the Illinois courts and
the United States Supreme Court in Sprietsma. Part IV analyzes the
Court's decision, and Part V assesses its potential impact.

II. Background
A. The Doctrine of Federal Preemption
The doctrine of federal preemption originates from the
Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution.' 0 Preemption
can be explicit, where a statute explicitly states that it preempts state
7 Compare Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d 598,
602 (5th Cir.
2000), Cartensen v. Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 433 (8th Cir. 1995), Moss v.
Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F. Supp. 183, 187 (E.D. Cal. 1996), Davis v.
Brunswick Corp., 854 F. Supp. 1574, 1586 (N.D. Ga. 1994), Shield v. Bayliner
Marine Corp., 822 F. Supp. 81, 84 (D. Conn. 1993), Shields v. Outboard Marine
Corp., 776 F. Supp. 1579, 1583 (N.D. Ohio 1991), Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 557
N.W.2d 541, 551 (Mich. 1997), Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 757 N.E.2d 75, 77
(111. 2001) [hereinafter Sprietsma 11], and Farner v. Brunswick Corp., 607 N.E.2d

562, 567 (I11.App. Ct. 1993) (dismissing common law claims against boat engine

manufacturers as preempted either expressly by the FBSA or impliedly by the
FBSA and the Coast Guard's decision), with Moore v. Brunswick Bowling &
Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Tex. 1994), and Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d
594, 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999) (holding that common law claims were not
preempted by the FBSA or the Coast Guard's decision).
8 See Sprietsma I1, 123 S. Ct. at 522.
9 Id. at 529-30.
..See Ray v. Atd. Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 157 (1978).
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law, or implied. 1 There are two types of implied preemption: field
preemption and conflict preemption. A state law is invalid under the
doctrine of field preemption when Congress intends to occupy an
entire field and the state law falls into that field. 13 Even when
Congress does not intend to occupy an entire field, conflict
preemption establishes that a state law is invalid if it obstructs the
purposes and objectives of Congress or creates a situation where it is
impossible to comply with both the state and federal law.' 4 The
Supreme Court has stated that such a situation may go by the name of
"conflicting,"
"contrary
to,"
"repugnance,"
"difference,"
"irreconcilability," "inconsistency,"
"violation," "curtailment,"
"interference," or anything of the like.' 5
In applying the preemption doctrine to state law, the first step
is to determine the intent of Congress.1 6 The first place to look for
17
congressional intent is the plain wording of any preemption clause.
There is a common assumption that the historic police powers of the
states are not to be superseded by federal law unless that is the clear
and manifest intent of Congress.

8

It is important to note, however,

that the two forms of implied preemption are not barred simply
because a federal law lacks express preemption by either lacking a
preemption clause or containing a savings clause. 19 Also, the relative
importance to the state of its own law is immaterial when applying
the preemption doctrine, because the framers of the U.S. Constitution
provided that federal law must prevail.20

" See id.
12 Silkwood

v. Kerr-McGee Corp., 464 U.S. 238, 248 (1984).

13

id.

14

Id.

15

See Geier v. Am. Honda Motor Co., Inc., 529 U.S. 861, 873 (2000) (internal

quotation marks omitted).
16 Ray, 435 U.S. at 157.
17 Sprietsma II1,
18

Ray, 435

U.S. at 869.
Free v. Bland, 369 U.S. 663, 666 (1962) (citing U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2).

19 Geier, 529
20

123 S.Ct. at 526.

U.S. at 157.
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B. The Federal Boat Safety Act
The Federal Boat Safety Act ("FBSA") was passed by
Congress in 1971 in an attempt to regulate boating safety. 2 1 The
FBSA applies to recreational vessels and equipment on any waters
that are subject to the jurisdiction of the United States and to any
vessel owned in the United States. 22 The FBSA's stated purpose is to
coordinate a national boating safety program to improve safety b3
requiring safer boats and boating equipment from manufacturers.
Eventually, through the Coast Guard's efforts, boating safety would
be improved by implementing uniform regulations throughout the
country. 24 The FBSA grants the authority to promulgate regulations
to the secretary of whichever department operates the Coast Guard,
currently the Secretary of Transportation. 2? The authority to issue
regulations for minimum safety standards was delegated to the Coast
Guard by the Secretary of Transportation in 1972.26
The FBSA contains two clauses of key importance with
respect acto
preemption 7of state tort claims: the preemption
nl d2
afederal
us
clause and the savings clause. The preemption clause provides that
no state or subdivision thereof may establish or continue any
regulation that establishes an equipment or performance standard that
is not "identical to a regulation prescribed under" the FBSA, unless
specifically exempted by the Secretary. 28 The savings clause states
that compliance with the FBSA29does not remove a person from
common law or state law liability.

Federal Boat Safety Act of 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-75, 85 Stat. 213-14
(codified as amended at 46 U.S.C. §§ 4301-11 (2002)).
21

22

46 U.S.C. § 4301(a) (2002).

23

See id. § 4302(a)(1).

24

See id.

25

Id. § 4302.

26

See Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 523-24 (citing 49 C.F.R. § 1.46(n)(1)

(2002)).
27

Id. at 524.

28

46 U.S.C. § 4306.

29

Id. § 4311.
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C. The Coast Guard's 1988 Propeller Guard Decision
In response to the number of injuries and fatalities caused by
boat propeller accidents, the Coast Guard, pursuant to its authority
under the FBSA, decided in 1988 that a special inquiry should be
made into a potential propeller guard regulation.
Acting on
authority from the Coast Guard, the National Boating Safety
Advisory Committee appointed a special Propeller Guard
Subcommittee to review the data on the prevention of propeller strike
accidents and to study the available methods of shrouding propellers
to prevent such accidents. 3 1 The Subcommittee ended its 18-month
study by recommending that no regulatory action be taken. 32 The
Subcommittee cited many factors, including the fact that propeller
guards would harm boat performance, and although propeller guards
would decrease penetrating injuries, they would increase blunt
trauma.33 The subcommittee also found that a regulation requiring
propeller guards would be prohibitively expensive because there
is no
34
boats.
existing
retrofit
to
used
be
could
that
universal design
The Advisory Committee and, in turn, the Coast Guard,
endorsed the Subcommittee's findings and decision. 35 The Coast
Guard decided not to issue any regulations at that time, finding that
the data did not support adopting them at that time. 36 The Coast
Guard did, however, pledge that it would review available
information on propeller guard regulation and stay abreast of state-ofthe-art technology.37 In 2001, the Coast Guard invited public
comment on the possibility of a propeller guard regulation. 39The
Coast Guard has not yet adopted any of the proposed regulations.

30

Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 525.

31

Id.

32

Id.

33

id.

34

Id.

35 Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 525.
36

id.

37

id.

Coast Guard Federal Requirements for Propeller Injury Avoidance
Measures, 66 Fed. Reg. 63645 (2001) (to be codified at 33 C.F.R. pt. 175).
38

39 See 33 C.F.R. pt. 175 (2003).
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D. Cases Preceding the Court's decision in Sprietsma
Although many cases prior to Sprietsma considered the FBSA
and its preemptive effect on state tort law claims, they reached no
uniform conclusion. 40 The courts found explicit preemption in six
cases and implied preemption in seven. 41 Only two courts found no

preemption. 4 Of these cases, eight were decided in federal courtsall finding either explicit or implied preemption-and five were
decided in state courts-three finding explicit preemption and two
finding no preemption. 43
The courts that found express federal preemption relied on
the preemption clause of the FBSA.45 These courts held that the
question regarding express preemption under the FBSA was not
whether Congress had preemptive intent, but rather, how much did
Congress intend to preempt by the FBSA's express provision.46 The
preemption clause itself basically provides that any state law that is
Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d 598, 601 (5th Cir. 2000).
Express preemption was found in the following cases: Cartensen v.
Brunswick Corp., 49 F.3d 430, 432 (8th Cir. 1995); Davis v. Brunswick Corp., 854
F. Supp. 1574, 1580 (N.D. Ga. 1994); Shield v. Bayliner Marine Corp., 822 F.
Supp. 81, 84 (D. Conn. 1993); Mowery v. Mercury Marine, 773 F. Supp. 1012,
1017 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Ryan v. Brunswick Corp., 557 N.W.2d 541, 551 (Mich.
1997); Farner v. Brunswick Corp., 607 N.E.2d 562, 567 (I11. App. Ct. 1993).
Implied preemption was found in the following cases: Sprietsma v. Mercury
Marine, 757 N.E.2d 75, 86 (I11. 2001); Lady v. Neal Glaser Marine, Inc., 228 F.3d
598, 615 (5th Cir. 2000); Moss v. Outboard Marine Corp., 915 F. Supp. 183, 187
(E.D. Cal. 1996); Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1581; Shield, 822 F. Supp. at 84; Shields
v. Outboard Marine Corp., 775 F. Supp. 1579, 1581 (N.D. Ohio 1991); Lewis v.
Brunswick Corp., 107 F.3d 1494, 1504 (11 th Cir. 1997).
42 Moore v. Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246, 252 (Tex.
1994); Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594, 601 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999).
43 The Federal cases are as follows: Lady, 228 F.3d at 615; Cartensen,
49 F.3d
at 432; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 187; Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1580-81; Shield, 822 F.
Supp. at 84; Shields, 776 F. Supp. at 1581; Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1504; Mowery, 773
F. Supp. at 1017. The State cases are as follows: Sprietsma I, 757 N.E.2d at 86;
Ryan, 557 N.W.2d at 551; Farner,607 N.E.2d at 567; Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 252;
Ard, 996 S.W.2d at 601.
40
4

" See Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 185; Cartensen, 49 F.3d at 431; Davis, 854 F.
Supp. at 1580; Shield, 822 F. Supp. at 84; Mowery, 773 F. Supp. at 1014; Ryan,
557 N.W.2d at 545; Sprietsma v Mercury Marine, 729 N.E.2d 45, 48 (II. App. Ct.
2000) [hereinafter Sprietsma I]; Farner,607 N.E.2d at 567.
4'

46 U.S.C. § 4306.

46

See, e.g., Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1500.
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not identical to the regulations promulgated by the Coast Guard is
preempted.47 These courts also found that the decision not to regulate
has all the preemptive force of a regulation.48 Therefore, the courts
essentially concluded that any state law requiring guards is
preempted because it would not be identical to the Coast Guard's
position.49
Also, jury damage awards can impose a state regulation just
as if it was enacted by state statute. 50 Therefore, the courts that found
express preemption reasoned that a common law tort action in which
damages are awarded would be tantamount to a state regulation
requiring the use of propeller guards, and therefore, would stand in
direct opposition to the regulation that there is no mandate for the use
of propeller guards. 5'
The plaintiff in Cartensen v. Brunswick Corporation argued
that the savings clause52 in the FBSA alters the preemption analysis.53
The Eighth Circuit Court of Appeals rejected that argument,
however, holding that a savings clause cannot save common law
rights, "'the continued existence of which would be absolutely
inconsistent with the provisions of the act.'"4 The court went on to
hold that a general remedies savings clause "'cannot be allowed to
supersede the specific substantive pre-emption provision,"' but the
interpretation of the savings
clause "'must be guided by the goals and
55
Act.'
the
of
policies
Seven cases prior to the U.S. Supreme Court's decision in
Sprietsma found implied preemption of state law claims by the
FBSA. 56 Two of these courts also found express preemption under

41

See id. at 1500-01.

48

Cartensen, 49 F.3d at 431.

49 See id.
50

Id. at 432.

51

Id.
52 The savings clause reads, "Compliance with this chapter or standards,
regulations, or orders prescribed under this chapter does not relieve a person from
liability at common law or under State law." 46 U.S.C. § 4311(g) (2002).
53 Cartensen, 49 F.3d at 432.
54 Id. (quoting Texas & Pac. Ry. v. Abilene Cotton Oil Co., 204 U.S. 426, 446

(1907)).
55 Id. (citations omitted).
56

See supra note 41 (listing the seven cases finding implied preemption).
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the analysis described above, while five of them found only implied
preemption. 57 The courts that found implied federal preemption
began by analyzing the Coast Guard's decision not to regulate
propeller guards, and found that that decision was tantamount to a
federal regulation. 58 They then held that a jury award of damages in a
tort or products liability case is tantamount to a state law or
regulation requiring manufacturers to outfit their products with
propeller guards. 59 These courts concluded that a state regulationeven if created by a jury award-would both stand as an obstacle to
and frustrate the purposes of the FBSA, because the Coast Guard
decided that the area is best left unregulated.6 °
Of the thirteen cases that have ruled on the preemptive effect
of the FBSA on state tort actions, only two have found that there is
no preemptive effect. 6 1 Both of these cases began with the
presumption that preemption does not apply because of the states'
interest in health and safety. 62 Both cases also found it important that
the FBSA contains a savings clause. 63 In Ard v. Jensen, for example,
the Missouri Court of Appeals for the Western District held that, by
using a savings clause, Congress intended that manufacturers should
not be shielded from liability simply because they complied with the
FBSA. 64 That court went on to hold that, although Congress wanted
to spare manufacturers from state laws that differed from state to

" Compare Davis, 854 F. Supp. at 1580, and Shield, 822 F. Supp. at 84

(finding express preemption in addition to implied preemption), with Sprietsma II,
757 N.E.2d at 86, Lady, 228 F.3d at 615, Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 187, Shields, 776 F.
Supp. at 1581, and Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1504 (finding only implied preemption).
See Lady, 228 F.3d at 614; Lewis 107 F.3d at 1505; Davis, 854 F. Supp. at
1580; Shields, 776 F. Supp. at 1581; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; Shield, 822 F.
58

Supp. at 84; Sprietsma II, 757 N.E.2d at 86.
59 See Lady, 228 F.3d at 614; Lewis 107 F.3d at 1505; Davis, 854 F. Supp. at

1580; Shields, 776 F. Supp. at 1581; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; Shield, 822 F.

Supp. at 84; Sprietsma 11, 757 N.E.2d at 86.
60 See Lady, 228 F.3d at 614; Lewis 107 F.3d at 1505; Davis, 854 F. Supp. at
1580; Shields, 776 F. Supp. at 1581; Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 186; Shield, 822 F.
Supp. at 84; Sprietsma II, 757 N.E.2d at 86.
61 See Ard v. Jensen, 996 S.W.2d 594 (Mo. Ct. App. 1999); Moore v.

Brunswick Bowling & Billiards Corp., 889 S.W.2d 246 (Tex. 1994).
62

Ard, 996 S.W.2d at 599; Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 249-50.

63

Ard, 996 S.W.2d at 599; Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 250 (discussing 46 U.S.C. §

4311).
64

Ard, 996 S.W.2d at 599.
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state, it would be improper to allow the manufacturers65to design boats
that they should reasonably foresee as causing injury.
Similarly, the Texas Supreme Court in Moore v. Brunswick
Bowling & Billiards Corp. recognized that, although a jury verdict in
a state tort action may be similar to a regulation, that verdict does not
have the same regulatory effect as a positive enactment and is not
enough to trigger preemption. 66 The court reasoned that the phrase
"laws or regulations" in the preemption clause 67 did not include the
common law, because Congress evidenced the fact that it would use
the term "common law" when it meant to include the common law in
a provision's scope, as it did in the savings clause. 68 In holding that
the preemption clause did not include the common law, the court also
refused to accept the position that the grounds of a state tort action
must be predicated on laws that are identical to those promulgated by
the Coast Guard under the FBSA.69
In 1997, these varying applications of the FBSA to state tort
actions led the U.S. Supreme Court to grant certiorari in Lewis v.
Brunswick Corporation. The Court never decided the case,
however, because the parties settled. 7 But later, in Sprietsma, the
Court finally ruled
on the question of whether the FBSA preempts
state tort actions.7 2

III. Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine
A. Lower Court Decisions
On July 10, 1995, Jeanne Sprietsma was riding on an 18-foot
boat powered by a 115-horsepower outboard motor on a lake
spanning the Tennessee-Kentucky border. 73 The motor was

65 See

id.

66

See Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 249-50.

67

46 U.S.C. § 4306 (2002).

68

Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 250.

69

See id.

70 See id.

" See id.
72 Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 530.
71 Id. at 522.

340

Loyola Consumer Law Review

[Vol. 15: 4

manufactured by Mercury Marine, a division of the Brunswick
Corporation. 74 The motor was not equipped with any sort of propeller
guard.75 As the driver of the boat made a right turn, Sprietsma was
thrown from the boat and came into contact with the propeller, killing
her.7 6

Sprietsma's husband filed suit against Mercury Marine,
among others, for wrongful death.77 He sought to recover for his
wife's pain and suffering, as well as the loss of consortium and
pecuniary loss suffered by himself and his son. 78 The complaint in the
case had nine counts, all of which sought recovery under state law.7 9
The complaint stated in each count that the defendant's failure to
equip the engine with a propeller guard created an unreasonably
dangerous product. 80 The defendants filed a motion to dismiss,
arguing that the FBSA both expressly and impliedly preempted the
state tort claims. The trial court granted the motion, holding that,
although the claims were not expressly preempted, they were
impliedly preempted.82
The trial court decision was affirmed by the Illinois Court of
Appeals for the First District on April 6, 2000.83 The appellate court
began by reviewing the statutory language of both the preemption
and savings clauses, as well as the Coast Guard's 1988 decision not
to regulate propeller guards. 84 The court recognized that a reviewing
court should be reluctant to find preemption when the state law is in
an area traditionally reserved for the states, and that preemption
should only be found where it is the clear and manifest purpose of
Congress. The court then noted that Illinois courts, other than the

74

Sprietsma 111, 123 S. Ct. at 530.

75 Sprietsma I!, 757 N.E.2d at 77.
76

Sprietsma 1, 729 N.E.2d at 46.

77 Sprietsma 1I, 757 N.E.2d at 77.
78 id.
79 Sprietsma II, 123 S. Ct. at 522.
80 id.
81 Sprietsma 1I, 757 N.E.2d at 77.
82

id.

83 See Sprietsma 1, 729

84 See id. at 47.
85 Id. at 48.

N.E.2d at 45.
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Illinois Supreme Court, are bound by the decisions of federal courts
interpreting federal acts when there is a split of federal authority and
the United States Supreme Court has not yet ruled.86 The appellate
court followed the reasoning of the Eighth Circuit in Cartensen v.
Brunswick Corporation87 and held that the plaintiffs' claims were
expressly preempted by the FBSA. The
89 appellate court did not
address the subject of implied preemption.
The Illinois Supreme Court reviewed the decision of the court
of appeals on August 16, 2001.90 The court began by examining the
legislative history of the FBSA in order to determine the
congressional purpose. 91 Next, the court examined the Coast Guard's
1988 decision not to regulate propeller guards.9 2 The first step the
court took in its preemption analysis was to determine whether there
was a presumption against preemption. 93 The court held that, in light
of U.S. Supreme Court precedent, there was no presumption against
preemption because maritime law is an area traditionally reserved for
federal regulation. 94 The Illinois Supreme Court stated that, although
it would give some deference to the federal court decisions
interpreting the FBSA in an effort to establish uniformity, that

86

Id. at 48-49.

See id at 49-51. The Eighth Circuit held that for purposes of preemption
there is no distinction between an enactment and common law and that the
preemption clause preempts any state law that is not identical to the Federal
regulations. Cartensen, 49 F.3d at 431-32. It further held that the savings clause is
merely in place to allow liability for defectively designed products. Id. The court
concluded that a plaintiff may not bring suit for failing to install a propeller guard if
such as guard is not required by Federal regulation, but if a manufacturer did decide
87

to install a propeller guard, and did so negligently, that manufacturer could not
raise its compliance with the act as a per se defense. Id.
88 See Sprietsma I, 729 N.E.2d at 51.
89 See
90

id.

See Sprietsma II, 757 N.E.2d at 75.

9' Id. at 78. The court found that the purpose was to provide safer boats and
boating equipment through the use of safety standards in a coordinated national
safety program, as promulgated by the Coast Guard. Sprietsma II, 757 N.E.2d at
78.
92 See id. at 78-79.
9' See id. at 79.
94 See id. at 80 (citing Foremost Insurance Co. v. Richardson, 457 U.S. 668,

674 (1982) (holding that the collision of two pleasure boats fell within maritime
jurisdiction, an area traditionally reserved for federal jurisdiction)).
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would be given only if the federal
deference was not unlimited and
95
sense.
makes
court's rationale
Against that background, the court first considered the issue
96
of express preemption. The court began with the language of the
clause and held that the statute intended to include common law
claims by using the term "laws and regulations." 97 The court noted,
however, that the preemption clause must be read in combination
with the savings clause, and that the existence of a savings clause
forbids a broad interpretation of a preemption clause. 98 Therefore, the
the FBSA did not expressly preempt the plaintiffs'
court held,
99
claims.
00
Next, the court considered the issue of implied preemption.
The court relied on U.S. Supreme Court precedent to establish that
implied preemption is found either where it is "impossible for a
private party to comply with both state and federal requirements," or
where state law "stands as an obstacle to the accomplishment and
execution of the full purposes and objectives of Congress."'' ° The
court noted that it would be possible for a manufacturer to comply
with a state common law rule requiring propeller guards and the
Coast Guard's decision not to regulate them. r ° 2 As such, the court
03
held that the first rule of implied preemption did not apply.'
Therefore, the court only concerned itself with the second
consideration-whether "a state common law tort claim based on
failure to install the propeller guards stands as an obstacle to the
accomplishment of the purposes and objectives Congress sought to
achieve in enacting the FBSA."' 0 4 The court then relied on the

95See Sprietsma II, 757 N.E.2d at 80.
96 Id.
97 See id. at 81.
98 See id.

99 See id. at 82.
'oo See id.
Sprietsma H, 757 N.E.2d at 82. For the first proposition, the court cited
English v. Gen. Elec. Co., 496 U.S. 72, 74 (1990). For the second state proposition,
the court cited Hines v. Davidowitz 312 U.S. 52, 67-68 (1941).
102 id.
101

103 See id.
'14

See id.
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Supreme Court's ruling in Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 10 5 and
decided that the Coast Guard's affirmative decision not to regulate
meant that the Coast Guard believed that the area of propeller guards
was best left unregulated. 10 6 The court then ruled that allowing
common law verdicts would, in effect, require manufacturers to use
propeller guards.107 The court concluded that the plaintiffs' claims
were impliedly preempted because such a requirement would
08
frustrate the objectives of Congress in promulgating the FBSA.1
Thus, the Illinois Supreme Court affirmed the appellate court's
decision, albeit on different grounds.' 0 9
B. The United States Supreme Court's Decision
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to Joanne Sprietsma's
husband on January 22, 2002.110 The Court found that, although it1
had no reason to decide the merits of the claim under Illinois law,"
three theories could support the preemption defense: (1) that the
FBSA expressly preempts common law claims; (2) that the Coast
Guard's decision not to regulate propeller guards impliedly preempts
common law claims; and (3) that the potential conflict between
diverse state rules and the federal interest in a uniform system of
regulation impliedly preempts such claims.112
1. Express Preemption
Regarding express preemption, the Supreme Court first
focused on the plain wording of the statute as the best indicator of
105

435 U.S. 151 (1978). In Ray, the Supreme Court held that enforcement of a

state size requirement for oil tankers, an area unregulated by the federal
government, would at the least frustrate the purpose of the Vehicle Safety Act,
which was to establish a uniform federal regime covering tankers. Ray, 435 U.S. at
165-68.
106

See Sprietsma II, 757 N.E.2d at 85.

107

Id.

108 See id.
'09

See id. at 86.

110

Sprietsma v. Mercury Marine, 534 U.S. 1112 (2002).

1" This was because the preemption defense raised a threshold issue, and
therefore the Court did not need to decide the merits or viability of the claim under
Illinois law. Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 522.
112 See id. at 522-23.
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congressional intent. 11 3 The Court chose to focus on the phrase "a
[state or local] law or regulation" in the preemption clause of the
FBSA. 114 The Court concluded that Congress did not intend to
preempt common law claims for two reasons. 115 First, the Court
reasoned that there is a discreteness implied by the use of the article
"a" before "law or regulation" in statutes and regulations that is not
present in the common law." 6 Second, the Court relied on the
principle that "a word is known by the company it keeps," and that by
using "law" and "regulation," Congress intended that only positive
enactments be preempted." 7 The Court reasoned that if "law" was
read broadly enough to include the common law, then it would also
include regulations. 18 Such a reading would render the preemption
clause's use of the word "regulations" superfluous, which would
violate the principle that every word in a statute has meaning.119
The Court then relied on the savings clause to support its
decision that the common law is not included in the preemption
clause. 120 The Court again cited two reasons. First, the Court held
that, because the FBSA contains a savings clause, there must be a
significant number of common law claims to save, and that means
that the preemption clause should be read narrowly.' 2 1 Second, the
Court held that, although the use of "common-law" in the savings
clause is broad, the preemption clause is fairly specific, and should
therefore be narrowly interpreted.122 For these reasons, the Court held
that the FBSA does not expressly preempt state tort actions.123

...Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 526.
114Id. at 526 (alteration in original).
'" See
116

id.

Id.

117 Id.

118

Sprietsma 11, 123 S. Ct. at 526.

119Id.
120

Id.

121 Id.
122

See id.at 526-27.

123

See Sprietsma 111, 123 S. Ct. at 526-27.
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2. Implied Preemption Based on the Decision Not to
Regulate
The Court began its analysis of the Coast Guard's decision
not to regulate in the area of propeller guards by concluding that that
decision was not equivalent to a decision to regulate. 124 The Court
reasoned that the decision left the area exactly as it was before the
Coast Guard began its investigation into whether to regulate the
area. 125 The Court held that the Coast Guard's earlier decisions under
the FBSA supported this reasoning. 126 Just after the enactment of the
FBSA, the Secretary of Transportation exempted all then-existing
state legislation regarding boat safety, and even after the Coast Guard
began to promulgate regulations, all areas of state legislation that
were left unregulated by the federal government were allowed to
maintain their exemption status. 127 The Court also discussed the
rationale behind the Coast Guard's decision not to regulate propeller
guards. 128 According to the Court, the Coast Guard did not decide
that the area was best left unregulated, but rather that the proposed
regulations simply did not live up to the stringent standards that must
be met in order to pass a regulation. 29 The Court concluded that a
jury verdict stating that a manufacturer should have installed a guard
of the Coast Guard: the lack
would not go against the main concern
30
of universally acceptable designs.'

124

See id. at 527.

'5

See id.

126

See id. at 527-28.

127

Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 524.

121

See id. at 528 (holding that the Coast Guard decided not to regulate because

there could be technical problems with boat operation if all boats had propeller
guards, the cost of retro-fitting all existing boats would be cumbersome and
expensive, there were no universally acceptable designs for all boats, and the
regulatory process is very structured and stringent).
129 See
130

id.

See id.
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The Court then distinguished Sprietsma from other cases
where it held that a decision not to regulate was tantamount to an
affirmative regulation.' 31 Most important, the Court distinguished
Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 132 because that decision left it
to the manufacturers to determine what kind of passive restraint
system should be used, while in Sprietsma, the decision not to
regulate was not based on any such consideration. 133
3. Implied Preemption Based on Congressional Intent to
Reserve Boat Safety Regulation to the Federal
Government
Finally, the Court discussed the issue of field preemption
under the FBSA. 134 The Court relied on Ray v. Atlantic Richfield
Co. 135 and United States v. Locke 136 for the proposition that the states
may not regulate in any area where Congress has reserved the entire
field for federal legislation.' 37 In applying that rule in Sprietsma, the
Court distinguished the FBSA from Ray and Locke because the
statutes considered in those cases required the Secretary to
promulgate regulations. 138 Under the FBSA, however, the Coast
Guard is139 not required to regulate every aspect of recreational
boating.
The Court also distinguished those cases because they

131

See Sprietsma I1, 123 S. Ct. at 528.

132

Geier v. American Honda Motor Co., 529 U.S. 861, 881 (2000). Geier

involved a regulation promulgated under the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Act that
required not airbags, but a different passive restraint system. See id. at 881.
133 See Sprietsma Il, 123 S. Ct. at 528-29.
l" See id. at 529.
135 Ray v. Atlantic Richfield Co., 435 U.S. 151, 165 (1978). Ray involved a
federal statute regarding the gross tonnage of oil tankers, which the State of
Washington attempted to modify for tankers on the Puget Sound by its own statute.
See id. at 165.
136 United States v. Locke, 529 U.S. 89, 111 (2000). Locke involved a
challenge by the International Association of Independent Tanker Owners
("Intertanko") of a Washington statute that related to oil tankers and the
preventative methods the state tried to employ to avoid oil spills. See id. at 111.
137 See Sprietsma 11, 123 S. Ct. at 529.
138

See id.

139

See id.
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140
involved statutes and did not purport to preempt state tort actions.
The Court then pointed out its 1conclusion
that the savings clause
41
expressly preserved those claims.
The Court went on to concede that the FBSA could be
interpreted as expressly occupying the field of state positive laws and
regulations. 42 The Court then stated its conclusion that the FBSA
lacks a "clear and manifest" intent to implicitly preempt all state
common law relating to boat manufacture. 43 Rather, in the Court's
opinion, the FBSA has the opposite intent,
so as to allow state
44
common law relating to boat manufacture. 1
Finally, the Court considered Mercury Marine's argument that
allowing state tort claims would go against one of the stated goals of
the FBSA, namely, uniformity in manufacturing regulations. 4 4 The
Court recognized that the preemption clause was meant to "assur[e]
that manufacture for the domestic trade will not involve compliance
with widely varying local requirements."' ' 46 The Court, however,
rejected this argument, ruling that the interest in uniformity is not
unyielding. 147 The Court then ruled that state common law remedies
that compensate accident victims and serve the promotion of
48 boat
safety should not be displaced by the argument for uniformity.

IV. Analysis
This analysis will answer three questions: (1) whether the
FBSA expressly preempts state tort claims; (2) whether the Coast
Guards decision not to regulate propeller guards implicitly preempts
state tort claims; and (3) whether the FBSA, regardless of actions
taken by the Coast Guard, impliedly preempts state tort claims. This
note concludes that, although the FBSA does not expressly preempt

141

See id. at 529-30.
See id.

142

Id. at 530.

'40

143Sprietsma III,

123 S. Ct. at 530.

144 id.
145 Id.
146

Id.

147 Id.
148

Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 530.
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all state tort claims,149 the Coast Guard's decision not to regulate,
when considered in conjunction with the plain language and the
legislative history of the FBSA, impliedly preempts the ability of
parties to file state tort claims for failure to exceed the safety
regulations promulgated by the Coast Guard.
A. The Failure of the Express Preemption Defense
As the U.S. Supreme Court stated, express preemption
depends on congressional intent, and the best evidence of
congressional intent is the plain language of the FBSA's preemption
clause. 150 The preemption clause reads as follows:
Unless permitted by the Secretary under section 4305 of
this title, a State or political subdivision of a State may not
establish, continue in effect, or enforce a law or regulation
establishing a recreational vessel or associated equipment
performance or other safety standard or imposing a
requirement for associated equipment ... that is not
identical 15to1 a regulation prescribed under section 4302 of
this title.
Although the Court gave two reasons that this clause does not
preempt state law claims, its second reason is more compelling. The
Court ruled that a "word is known by the company it keeps" and
applied that principle to the placement of the words "law" and
"regulation" in the same clause. 152 The Court made a compelling
argument that if the word "law" were read broadly enough to include
both the common law and the acts of legislatures, then it would
include regulations as well. 153 Because that reading would make the
word "regulation" superfluous, the Court was correct in concluding
that the word "law" in the54 preemption clause of the FBSA does not
include the common law. 1
The Court also correctly interpreted the savings clause of the
149 For example, the FBSA does not expressly preempt state
tort claims for
defectively designed products that are actually installed. Cartensen, 49 F.3d at 432.
50 See Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 526.

"' 46 U.S.C. § 4306 (2002).
152 Sprietsma 111, 123 S. Ct. at 526.
153

See id.

154

See id.
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FBSA.155 The savings clause reads, in part: "compliance with this
chapter or standards, regulations, or orders prescribed under this
chapter does not relieve a person from liability at common law or
under State law." 1 56 The courts that have considered this issue have
interpreted this clause as affecting the preemption clause in three
ways.
First, the Supreme Court held that the savings clause does not
support the express preemption argument because the use of the
broad term "common law" in the savings clause emphasizes the
narrow scope of the preemption clause. 157 Second, the Illinois
Supreme Court stated that by using the terms "law or regulation" in
the preemption clause, Congress intended to preempt some state law
claims. 158 The court then ruled that the existence of the savings clause
prevented a broad reading of this preemption clause.' 59 Because of
this limitation, the Illinois Supreme Court found no express
preemption. 60 That court did hold, however, that there was implied
preemption for any claim based on a failure to install propeller
guards. 16 1 This decision was based on the Illinois Supreme Court's
finding that a jury verdict against propeller manufacturers would
present an obstacle to the accomplishment and execution of the
FBSA.' 62 Third, the Eighth Circuit, in Cartensen v. Brunswick Corp.,
relied on the historical notes accompanying the FBSA to determine
that, although the savings clause was intended to keep manufacturers
from asserting compliance with the FBSA as a defense in products
liability suits, it was not intended to allow tort claims when
compliance was unnecessary.' 63 The Illinois Court of Appeals for the
First District followed this view when it heard Sprietsma and held
that, although a manufacturer is not liable for failing to install a
propeller guard, once a manufacturer does so install, it can be held

155 See
156

id.

46 U.S.C. § 4311(g).

157See Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 526.
158

Sprietsma II, 757 N.E.2d at 81.

159 Id.

16oSee

id. at 82.

161

Id. at 86.

162

Id. at 85.

163

See Cartensen, 49 F.3d at 432.
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liable if the installation was performed negligently. 64 The Illinois
Court of Appeals also held that if a company installed a device
mandated by regulation, but did so negligently,
compliance with the
16
FBSA could not be used as a defense. 3
As the Supreme Court held in Sprietsma, for a preemption
clause to explicitly preempt state law, Congress must evidence a
"clear and manifest" intent to do SO. 1 6 6 However, as demonstrated
by
the four cases cited in the preceding paragraph, and the split of
authority in the other eleven cases that have considered the issue,
there are several possible ways to interret the meaning and intent of
the preemption clause in the FBSA. 1 7 In light of such a split of
authority, it would be difficult to say that Congress showed a "clear
and manifest" intention to preempt all state tort claims.
B. The Coast Guard's Decision Not to Regulate, Considered in
Conjunction with the Purpose and Intent of the FBSA,
Impliedly Preempts State Law Actions
A lack of express preemption does not bar a finding of
implied preemption.1 68 In its analysis of the Coast Guard's decision
not to regulate the subject of propeller guards, the Supreme Court
concluded in a matter-of-fact way that that decision did not carry the
weight of a regulation.169 The Court reasoned that, by not regulating
the area, the Coast Guard expressed no opinion and merely left the
regulatory scheme
way itholding
was. 17 in But
thatthat
reasoning
cannot
reconciled
with the the
Court's
Geier
a decision
not be
to
164

See Sprietsma 1, 729 N.E.2d at 49.

165See

id.

166 Sprietsma I11, 123 S. Ct. at 530.
167 Compare Sprietsma 1, 729 N.E.2d at 52, Cartensen, 49 F.3d at 432, Davis

854 F. Supp. at 1580, Shield, 822 F. Supp. at 84, Mowery, 773 F. Supp. at 1017,
Ryan, 557 N.W.2d at 551, Farner, 607 N.E.2d at 567 (all finding express
preemption based on the preemption clause), with Sprietsma 11, 757 N.E.2d at 86,
Lady, 228 F.3d at 615, Moss, 915 F. Supp. at 187, Shields, 776 F. Supp. at 1581,
Lewis, 107 F.3d at 1504 (all holding no express preemption, but that the
preemption clause implicitly preempts state action), and with Sprietsma 1II, 123 S.
Ct. at 530, Moore, 889 S.W.2d at 252, Ard, 996 S.W.2d at 601 (holding that the
preemption clause neither expressly nor implicitly preempts a state action).
161 Sprietsma II, 757 N.E.2d at 82 (citing Buckman Co. v. Plaintiffs'
Legal
Comm., 531 U.S. 341 (2001)).
69 Sprietsma I11, 123 S. Ct. at 527.
170 See id.
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regulate can be the equivalent of a decision that an area is best left
unregulated, so7 that alternative safety methods may be used by

manufacturers.'1
That is exactly what happened in Sprietsma. When the Coast
Guard decided not to require manufacturers to install propeller
guards, it cited the lack of a universally acceptable design for the
guards and the technical problems they might create.172 It also cited
the prohibitive cost of retro-fitting all existing boats.' 7 3 Although the
statute considered by the Geier Court is different from the FBSA in
that it required manufacturers to take some action, the FBSA and the
Coast Guard's decision not to regulate is more similar than the
Supreme Court concluded. In both cases, the regulating agencies
decided that the best course of action was to leave manufacturers
74
responsible for deciding what safety measures should be taken.1
But, in Sprietsma, the Court ignored this similarity and held that the
real reason for the Coast Guard's decision was the stringent
regulation process involved. 75 That may have been one of the Coast
Guard's reasons,
but the other reasons are very similar to the reasons
176

given in Geier.
As in Geier, the action here depends on the plaintiff's claim
that the manufacturers had a duty-contrary to the federal law at the

17' Geier 529 U.S. at 881.
172 Sprietsma III,
173

123 S. Ct. at 528.

Id.

174 See id. Since there is no universally accepted propeller guard design and

they are not feasible on all types of boats, the Coast Guard decided that the area of
propeller guards should remain unregulated, and therefore, within the discretion of
boat manufacturers to determine what to implement. This is further buttressed by
the Coast Guard's regulation in 2001 that certain types of boats should install some
sort of injury avoidance device, but left the type of device to the discretion of the
boat owner or manufacturer. See 66 Fed. Reg. 63645, 63647 (cited in Sprietsma III,
123 S. Ct. at 525-26).
175 See Sprietsma II1, 123 S. Ct. at 528. In Sprietsma, the Court focused on the
first clause of the Coast Guard's decision not to regulate, which did cite the
stringent process as a reason. Id. However, the Court did not mention the fact that
the data did not support the imposition of a regulation, or that there was a lack of
universally acceptable propeller guard designs, and that propeller guards may not
even be feasible on some types of boats. Id. The Court also did not seem to give
much weight to the Coast Guard's decision that propeller guards could lead to more
blunt trauma injuries, a statement the Court cited as coming from App. 36-38. Id.
176 See id.
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time-to install a particular safety device. 177 Since the two cases
involve very similar issues, 17 8 the analysis of Sprietsma should have
followed the analysis in Geier. As in Geier, nothing in the language
of the savings clause in this case suggests an intent to save state tort
actions that conflict with federal regulations. 79 The savings clause in
Sprietsma only provides that compliance with the FBSA and Coast
Guard regulations does not absolve liability from state law. 180 Since
the issue and savings clause in Sprietsma were so similar to those in
Geier, the Court should have held that a "no propeller" action
actually conflicts with the Coast Guard's decision not to require
propellers, and is therefore preempted by the FBSA. 181
The Sprietsma Court also held that a jury's decision that a
manufacturer should have installed a propeller guard would not
conflict with the Coast Guard's decision not to require propeller
guards. 182 But a jury verdict would conflict with that decision. As the
Court noted, the Coast Guard based its decision on the lack of
universally acceptable propeller guards, and the subsequent difficulty
manufacturers would have in meeting a propeller guard
requirement.183 The Court previously held that a jury verdict, and the
subsequent payment of damages, carries the same weight as a
decision of the state to regulate a given area. 184 The Court has also

177 See Sprietsma H, 757 N.E.2d at 83.
178

In Geier,the issue was whether a tort lawsuit for failure to install an airbag

conflicted with the Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard promulgated by the

Department of Transportation, FMVSS 208, which did not require the installation
of airbags, and thereby conflicted with the National Traffic and Motor Vehicle
Safety Act. See 529 U.S. at 865. In Sprietsma, the issue was whether a tort lawsuit
for failure to install a propeller guard conflicted with the Coast Guard's decision to
not require the installation of propeller guards. 123 S. Ct. at 523.
179 Geier, 529 U.S. at 869.
180 46 U.S.C. § 4311 (g) (2002). See also Geier, 529 U.S. at 869 (holding that
the words "[c]ompliance" and "does not exempt" simply bar a special kind of
defense, that compliance with a federal standard automatically exempts a defendant
from state law, whether the Federal Government meant that standard to be an
absolute requirement or only a minimum one) (alterations in original).
181 Paralleling the holding in Geier that a common law "no airbag" action
conflicted with the applicable Federal Motor Vehicle Safety Standard. Geier, 529
U.S. at 874.
182 Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 528.
18 See id.
184 See San Diego Bldg. Trades Council, Millmen's Union, Local 2020 v.
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held that even a state's effort to redress private wrongs or grant
compensation for past harm cannot be exerted to regulate activities
that are1potentially subject to the exclusive federal regulatory
scheme. 18 With respect to boating safety requirements, and
specifically propeller guards, a jury verdict would impose a need to
install propeller guards on all boats sold or owned by manufacturers
and boat owners who wish to avoid or reduce the risk of potential
liability. The Coast Guard decided that any such requirement would
be too difficult to accomplish, and implied that it should be left
unregulated by the state and federal governments.
The savings clause of the FBSA also leads to the conclusion
that state tort claims are preempted by the FBSA. In Geier, the Court
interpreted a nearly identical clause, which read, "compliance with
federal safety standards does not exempt any person from liability
under common law."'186 The Geier Court ruled that "nothing in the
language of the saving clause suggests an intent to save state-law tort
actions that conflict with federal regulations."' 87 The Court also ruled
that the use of the words "compliance" and "does not exempt" simply
bar a "special kind of defense, namely, a defense that compliance
with a federal standard automatically exempts a defendant from state
that standard to be an
law, whether the [f]ederal [g]overnment meant' 88
one."'
minimum
a
only
or
absolute requirement
The savings clause of the FBSA contains nearly identical
language, stating, "compliance with this chapter... does not relieve
a person from liability at common law

..

,189 It is difficult to

understand why the phrase "compliance ...does not relieve" allows
liability for all state tort claims, while the phrase "compliance...
does not exempt" allows liability for only some state tort claims. The
only difference between the two clauses is the use of the word
"relieve" in the FBSA and "exempt" in the statute interpreted in
Geier.190 These two words, as found in Merriam-Webster's
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236, 247 (1959) ("[Rjegulation can be as effectively exerted
through an award of damages as through some form of preventive relief. The
obligation to pay compensation can be, indeed is designed to be, a potent method of
governing conduct and controlling policy.").
185 Garmon, 359 U.S. at 247.
186

Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 (internal quotation marks omitted).

187

Id. at 869.

188

Id.

189

46

190

Geier, 529 U.S. at 868 (quoting 15 U.S.C. § 1397(k) (1988)).

U.S.C. § 4311(g) (2002).
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Thesaurus, are synonymous with each other, both meaning "to free
from an obligation."' 91 As such, the two clauses should be interpreted
to mean the same thing, since words in statutory interpretation should
be given their most natural reading. 192 Under either phrase, the
defendant is still, in theory, subject to some liability, and it makes no
sense that the extent of that liability would change drastically due to
the use of the word "relieve" instead of "exempt."
Finally, the purposes and objectives of the FBSA lead to the
conclusion that the FBSA preempts state law actions. The FBSA was
designed to form a coordinated national boating safety program and
improve boating safety by requiring manufacturers to provide safer
boats and boating equipment through national construction and
performance standards for boats. 93 A part of this goal is to create194a
uniform system of boat safety regulations throughout the country.
Nowhere in the statement of purpose did Congress state that it
intended to compensate victims of boating accidents. 95 Yet, the
Sprietsma Court decided that the purposes carefully outlined by
Congress were superceded by that goal. 196 That decision frustrates the
congressional intent.
The Court's decision in Sprietsma also overlooks the FBSA's
goal of uniformity. The Senate reaffirmed that goal when it stated
that the FBSA was intended to ensure that manufacturers in domestic
197
trade would not have to comply with varying local requirements.
This goal will be frustrated as courts make decisions in state tort
actions that will have the equivalent effect of regulating propeller
guards. The doctrine 98
of implied conflict preemption is designed to
prevent such a result.'
When considered together, these factors lead to the

191 MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE THESAURUS (11 th ed. 2003), available

at http://www.m-w.com.
192See Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 526.
193 See 46 U.S.C.

§§ 4301-02 (2002) (explaining that the Coast Guard

regulations and the FBSA apply to all boats in United States waters and owned in
the United States, and that the regulations may regulate vessels, equipment, and
tests to establish conformity with the regulations).
194Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 526.
195Id.
196

Id. at 530.

197id.

'98 Id. at 527.
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conclusion that, although it is not expressly stated in the FBSA,
Congress intended that the FBSA and the acts of the Coast Guard
would preempt state tort actions. The savings clause, read in light of
Geier, merely saves claims for product liability and negligent
compliance with the FBSA and Coast Guard regulations. It also
removes compliance with the FBSA as a defense. What the savings
clause does not do, however, is allow state tort claims alleging that
boat manufacturers should have implemented safety equipment when
that equipment is not required by the FBSA or Coast Guard
regulations. Such claims will frustrate the overriding purpose of the
FBSA, which is to establish uniformity.

V. Impact of Sprietsma
In 2000, 25 fatalities and 88 cases of other injuries occurred
from propeller strike. 99 In fact, this number may be even greater
because only the first cause of injury or fatality is reported, although
there is typically a series of events that contribute.20 0 Although
Sprietsma dealt with a claim for wrongful death, its holding will
probably be extended to non-fatal propeller injuries, because it
establishes that common law actions are not preempted by the FBSA,
provided that they do not conflict with existing regulations. 01
Assuming that the year 2000 statistics continue to hold true, the
number of claims against boat engine manufacturers across the
United States will probably rise dramatically. In 2000, propeller
injuries occurred in 33 states.20 2 Juries in each of those states may
soon begin awarding plaintiffs large judgments against boat engine
manufacturers.
If these verdicts are large enough, they will function just like
z
state laws requiring propeller guards.20
But, they will also vary from

at 21, 27.

'99

Id.

200

Id. at 27.

201

See Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 518.

202

See United States Coast Guard, Boating Statistics - 2000, at 30 (Oct. 1,

2001) http://www.uscgboating.org/statistics/Boating-Statistics_2000.pdf.
203 See Lady, 228 F.3d at 614 (citing San Diego Building Trades Council v.
Garmon, 359 U.S. 236 (1959)).
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state to state in terms of what types of boats were involved,2 °4 and the
sanctions imposed by the courts, such as fines payable to the state or
requirements of retrofitting boats. The resulting system of common
law requirements will vary all over the country, in complete
20 5
contradiction to the goal of uniformity embodied in the FBSA.
Manufacturers will be subject to changing requirements for
acceptable propeller guards from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. They
will also be subject to suits from plaintiffs injured by blunt-object
trauma from coming into contact with the guards-an outcome the
Coast Guard tried to prevent in 1988.206
Also, current boat owners will be forced to decide whether to
install propeller guards on their watercraft. Some courts might create
judicial exemptions for people who owned boats prior to the time the
common law causes of action are created. These exemptions could
create problems in cases like Sprietsma, where the accident took
2°
place on a border between states, 207
because of the varying
requirements and exemptions in different jurisdictions.
In all, Sprietsma will create varying laws throughout the
country. It will also lead to an increase in the number of claims,
creating costs for all parties to a litigation, and the system as a whole.
Boat manufacturers will spend more time and money on litigation
and will need to monitor the minute changes in every jurisdiction in
which they sell their products. Individual boat owners will also have
to follow the changing laws in deciding whether to update their
watercraft to avoid liability.
There are only a few ways to avoid these results. First, the
Supreme Court could overrule Sprietsma-an unlikely proposition.
Second, the Coast Guard could promulgate a propeller guard
regulation, either setting up requirements, or prohibiting state
regulation or lawsuits involving propeller guards. Finally, Congress
could amend the FBSA by clarifying congressional intent to preempt
common law tort claims, and specifying the types of claims that
survive under the savings clause.

204

See, e.g., United States Coast Guard, Boating Statistics - 2000, at 25 (Oct.

1, 2001) http://www.uscgboating.org/statistics/Boating-Statistics-2000.pdf, for an

example of the various types of boat classifications (there are others, including
length, etc.).
205 See Sprietsma I1, 123 S. Ct. at 527, 530.
216

See Lady, 228 F.3d at 605.

207

See Sprietsma III, 123 S. Ct. at 522.
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VI. Conclusion
In sum, the U.S. Supreme Court's decision that the FBSA
does not expressly preempt state tort actions against boat engine
manufacturers for failure to install propeller guards in Sprietsma was
correct. But, the Court should have found that the purpose and intent
of the FBSA and the Coast Guard's decision not to regulate in the
area of propeller guards, when considered together, impliedly
preempt those claims. The Court's holding to the contrary will
probably result in a series of jury verdicts and appellate court
decisions that will, in effect, regulate propeller guards and their use.
These doctrines will evolve differently in each state, making
compliance very difficult for boat owners and manufacturers.

